**Russia and the West (Intensive version)**

POS GU4875

# **Spring A 2021**

Monday through Thursday 10:10-11:25am

**Prof. Kimberly Marten**

**Office Hours:**

Tuesdays 2-4pm

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**Course Description**

Please note: because this is an intensive version of the course, its scope and aims differ a bit from how the semester-long version is designed. This course values depth over breadth, and regular engagement with the material instead of comprehensive exams.

Throughout history Russia has had an ambiguous relationship with the Western world. Sometimes “the West” has been vilified as a threat or an enemy, and other times it has been held up by Russians as a model to emulate. Russia and the Western world have never treated each other with indifference, and this love/hate relationship is in full force today—even as longstanding Western liberal democratic norms and values are under challenge from within. Historical memories and parallels abound in popular discussions. In this course, we will examine why this has been the case and what it means for Russian foreign and security policy today. Drawing on contributions from philosophers, historians and international relations scholars and practitioners, we will discuss whether Russia’s interaction with the West has been driven by realist great power considerations, by a cultural cycle of Orthodox Slavic nationalism or “Eurasianism” vs. pro-Western internationalism, by domestic political and economic interests, or by the idiosyncratic visions and interests of individual Russian leaders—and in turn, how choices made by “the West” have affected all these things. Students will be encouraged to come up with their own answers to these riddles, in class discussions and assignments.

This is not a survey course, but no background knowledge is required—only a deep interest in understanding Russia and its relationship to the West. There are no prerequisites. Please note that this is an intensive course, with corresponding expectations for daily class preparation.

**Learning Objectives**

Students who complete this course successfully will be able to:

* Demonstrate broad factual knowledge of selected key current and historical Russian political, foreign policy, and security issues.
* Apply causal theories drawn from the political science literature and other sources, to analyze, compare, and evaluate events and trends in Russian relations with the West.
* Synthesize facts and arguments across cases in order to reason critically and argue creatively, through both in-class oral discussions and written assignments.

### Course Requirements and Grading

All written assignments will be **submitted online via Courseworks/Canvas,** and must be in either Word or PDF format. Please note that undergraduate and graduate students will be graded separately (in other words, undergraduates are not competing against the graduate students in the course.)

**Written assignments:** There will be five essays (maximum length, 1000 words) due across the course of this 7-week period. All five must be turned in to receive a passing grade in the course, but the lowest score of the five will be dropped from the final grade calculation. The questions asked are below, and students are encouraged to start working on their ideas (and the readings that support those ideas) whenever they feel ready, rather than waiting until the last minute. (Note: each essay is independent of the others, and students are not expected to hold to a consistent perspective throughout the course; in fact, if the readings and discussion lead you to change your mind, so much the better!)

The major purposes of these essays are (1) to monitor student engagement with course reading materials and themes; and (2) to help students improve their analytic writing capabilities through practice and criticism. Students should feel free to include outside sources as necessary to support their arguments, but should remember that a fundamental purpose of each essay is to monitor whether the student is doing the assigned course readings.

Essay 1 (due Sunday, Jan. 24 at 5pm): Choose the two theoretical approaches toward explaining Russia’s recent policies towards the West (discussed in any readings from the last two weeks except McFaul) that you find most compelling. Describe in some detail what each of the two approaches says. Then choose which of the two you find *most* compelling, and explain why.

Essay 2 (due Sunday, Jan. 31 at 5pm): Consider the scope of Russia’s major military interventions from 2014-2020, in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Syria. Using this week’s readings, describe the most important aspects of each of those interventions in some detail. Then explain which theoretical approach explains Russia’s actions best, and why.

Essay 3 (due Sunday, Feb. 7 at 5pm): Using examples taken from this week’s readings, describe what you think are the most important aspects of Russia’s use of intelligence agencies abroad under Putin. Then answer the following question: would a different Russian leader have made different choices in using these intelligence agencies? In other words, how much of these recent patterns are due to Putin being president?

Essay 4 (due Sunday, Feb. 14 at 5pm): The West (especially the United States) enacts more sanctions in response to each Russian violation of an international norm. Yet Russian norm violations continue, seemingly unabated. Why? Using examples from this week’s readings, explain what motivates Russia to be what the West considers a “rogue” state.

Essay 5 (due Sunday, Feb. 21 at 5pm): Choose any one of the topics discussed in this week’s readings (arms control, frozen conflicts and Nagorno-Karabakh, the Arctic, Eurasia/China). First describe Russia’s current and recent policies toward this question. Then predict what you think Russia’s policies will look like in 10 years. Will they be the same or different, and why? Conclude by explaining what your answer says about which approach to explaining Russian foreign policy you find most compelling.

**Class participation:** Discussion is an important component of this course. Students are expected to attend all class sessions, and to be prepared to comment on the assigned readings. **Roll will be taken.** Please email Prof. Marten in advance if you must miss class. Everyone is allowed to miss one class without penalty, for any reason. **If you must miss more than one class, please plan to submit a one-page answer to one of the day’s discussion questions to make up for class participation that day.** For most sessions, Prof. Marten will lecture for 30-45 minutes, followed by discussion.

**Grading:**

Discussion: 20%

Essays: 5 essays are required in order to pass the course, but only 4 will be counted with the lowest grade dropped. Each essay: 20%

Separate handouts specify grading criteria for the essays and for discussion participation.

**PLEASE READ This Entire Section: Honor Code and Plagiarism**

All assignments in this class are to be completed in accordance with the Barnard Honor Code, whether or not the student is a Barnard student. **Courseworks will utilize Turnitin.com to check all essays for plagiarism.** “Plagiarism” is the use of someone else’s words or ideas without full and proper attribution. It is, at its core, the act of falsely implying or claiming credit for intellectual work that someone else did—and it is a violation of the Honor Code.

A paper is not “written” by cutting and pasting phrases from the work of others. Even if a cite is included to say where the cutting and pasting came from, and even if a word is changed here and there to make what some might call a “paraphrase,” that’s still plagiarism. One plagiarized phrase or sentence is plagiarism, even if the rest of the paper is original.

A paper is written by reading the work of others with an open and critical mind, taking notes in your own words on that writing, thinking about the issues independently and deeply, and then using your own words to analyze issues, while citing (*not* quoting) the contributions of others to your thinking. **You should only be using word-for-word quotations from a published source when the exact words matter greatly. Such quotations should be brief, rare, and placed in quotation marks.** All students receive in-depth briefings on plagiarism and proper citation techniques as part of their introductory days at Barnard and Columbia, and the definition here is standard not merely in the United States but globally (for example, at Sciences Po in Paris); it should not come as a surprise to anyone. Any student who nonetheless has any remaining questions about proper citation technique or about how to avoid plagiarism should discuss these questions and concerns with Prof. Marten before turning in the assignment in question. Plagiarism is often committed as an act of desperation under pressure. If you ever feel so pressured on an assignment that you are tempted to plagiarize, please contact Prof. Marten instead. Together we can work out a fair extension.

**Any essay which contains cut-and-pasted or “paraphrased” phrases or sentences where the source is correctly cited, but without quotation marks, will earn the lowest passing grade of 70. Any essay which contains similar phrases and sentences that are NOT properly cited will earn a zero.** Any student who violates the Honor Code on any assignment, including through plagiarism, will face dean’s discipline at their home college. Students affirm that all work turned in is their own, and that they have fully and accurately cited every written source, including web-based sources and unpublished sources (such as prior student papers), used in their writing. Students are allowed to consult with anyone they like as they begin thinking about their exam essays and research papers, but no further collaboration is allowed once they begin outlining and writing. In other words, **both the argumentative structure and the wording of all essays must be completely the student’s own work.**

**All students may use the Barnard and Columbia Writing Centers with no restrictions.** If you know that you have problems with your writing—and especially if you get comments on an assignment indicating that there are problems with your writing—you are strongly encouraged to use the Writing Centers. Please note that appointments there fill up fast, so you need to be proactive in scheduling them [hint: you know the due-dates of assignments already…].

**Accessibility and Disability Services Statement**

In order to receive disability-related academic accommodations for this course, students must first be registered with their school Disability Services (DS) office. Detailed information is available online for both the [Columbia](https://health.columbia.edu/services/register-disability-services) and [Barnard](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__barnard.edu_disabilityservices_students&d=DwMFAg&c=G2MiLlal7SXE3PeSnG8W6_JBU6FcdVjSsBSbw6gcR0U&r=QSRVDnH6TAV1o3lGfIufEbSiTPcVA73HarkXS4bEfPc&m=FHJX16hThyJy0HBIk-COxvCPLO7rxF8M7FWkz34a4qM&s=Qm1OrVwYTpMLRISxyCGs4D4yj3s2Y0KD0eWkzvYsTk0&e=) registration processes. Refer to the appropriate website for information regarding deadlines, disability documentation requirements, and [drop-in hours](https://health.columbia.edu/news/disability-services-supports-students-virtually) (Columbia)/[intake session](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__barnard.edu_disabilityservices_people&d=DwMFAg&c=G2MiLlal7SXE3PeSnG8W6_JBU6FcdVjSsBSbw6gcR0U&r=QSRVDnH6TAV1o3lGfIufEbSiTPcVA73HarkXS4bEfPc&m=FHJX16hThyJy0HBIk-COxvCPLO7rxF8M7FWkz34a4qM&s=vGuN_OaCZ_rAMdosqyO7VdfPLxkVzEcISCMw_LWbmWg&e=) (Barnard). (Please note that all written assignments in this class are take-at-home essays, and that time-and-a-half disability accommodations do not apply to take-at-home assignments.)

**Barnard Wellness Statement**

It is important for students to recognize and identify the different pressures, burdens, and stressors they may be facing, whether personal, emotional, physical, financial, mental, or academic. We as a community urge you to make yourself—your own health, sanity, and wellness—your priority throughout this term and your career here. Sleep, exercise, and eating well can all be a part of a healthy regimen to cope with stress. Resources exist to support you in several sectors of your life, and we encourage you to make use of them. Should you have any questions about navigating these resources, please visit these websites:

* <http://barnard.edu/primarycare>
* [http://barnard.edu/counseling](http://barnard.edu/counsel)
* <http://barnard.edu/wellwoman/about>
* [Stressbusters Support Network](http://health.columbia.edu/files/healthservices/pdf/alice_Stressbusters_Support_Network.pdf)

**Required Readings**

It is understood that the time compression of this course will prevent you from doing all of the assigned reading word-for-word. Please read things in the order that they are assigned, and please practice “strategic skimming,” looking for the main arguments of each piece and how they are supported by evidence—rather than concentrating on the factual details of history, for example. This will allow you to say something each day of class. You can then go back and read in depth those things that you wish to use in your essays.

All required readings are online; there are no textbooks to purchase. If you use the Courseworks/Canvas modules, you can link directly. **If you find a broken link on a module, please let Prof. Marten know right away.** Some readings are available on the open web; some are uploaded on the Courseworks/Canvas “files” page for this course; and most are on CLIO (Columbia’s online library), using your Columbia UNI and password. [Note that if you don’t go through CLIO on these, you will be asked to pay an exorbitant amount to get through the paywall.]

**Class Schedule**

**Part I: Using Theories to Explain Russian Foreign Policy**

Jan. 11: Introduction.

**Open web:**

Robert Jervis, “Theories of International Relations,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge Core (Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 9-24, <http://www.siwps.org/wp-content/uploads/Robert-Jervis-Theories-of-International-Relations.pdf>

**Note:** throughout the course we will be using broad theoretical perspectives on international relations and foreign policy to explain Russian choices, in particular: realism, levels of analysis (including political psychology and domestic politics), and various forms of social constructivism. Please refer back to this summary article frequently.

Jan. 12: Realism.

**CLIO:**

William C. Wohlforth and Vladislav Zubok, “An Abiding Antagonism: Realism, Idealism, and the Mirage of Western-Russian Partnership after the Cold War,” *International Politics* 54, no. 4 (2017), pp. 405-419.

Dmitry Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West,” *Foreign Affairs*, 85, no. 4 (July/Aug. 2006): 87-96. Trenin is one of the leading Russian analysts of the relationship between Russia and the West, and this piece is a classic example of realist analysis whose fundamental arguments have been borrowed by many since, often without attribution.

Jan. 13: The psychology of decision-making.

**CLIO:**

Tuomas Forsberg and Christer Pursiainen, “The Psychological Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy: Putin and the Annexation of Crimea,” *Global Society* 31, no. 2(2017): 220-44.

Valerie Sperling, “Putin's Macho Personality Cult,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 49 (2016): 13-23.

Jan. 14: Domestic politics: Patronage and today’s Russia.

**Courseworks files:**

Brian D. Taylor, *The Code of Putinism* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2018), chapter 3 (pp. 78-105).

**CLIO:**

Kimberly Marten, “Informal Political Networks and Putin’s Foreign Policy: The Examples of Iran and Syria,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 62 (2015): 71–87. (Note: This was published *before* Russia’s September 2015 military intervention in Syria.)

**Open web:**

Kimberly Marten, “Putin as Patron in Syria,” Ballots & Bullets Blog (University of Nottingham School of Politics and International Relations), Oct. 12, 2015, <https://nottspolitics.org/2015/10/12/putin-as-patron-in-syria/>

**Jan. 18. No class meeting; Martin Luther King Day.**

Jan. 19: Constructivism part 1: status, emotions and decline.

**CLIO:**

Fyodor Lukyanov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place,” *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 3 (May/June 2016): 30-37.

Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Russia Says No: Power, Status, and Emotions in Foreign Policy,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47, no. 3-4 (Sept. 2014): 269-79.

Jan. 20: Constructivism part 2: Slavophiles, Westernizers, and Eurasianism.

**CLIO:**

Alexander Lukin, “Eurasian Integration and the Clash of Values,” *Survival* 56, no. 3 (June-July 2014): 43-60.

Nadezhda Arbatova, “Three Faces of Russia’s Neo-Eurasianism,” *Survival* 61, no. 6 (2019): 7-24.

**Open web:**

“Report: German Neo-Nazis Training At Russian Terrorist Camp,” RFE/RL, June 6, 2020, <https://www.rferl.org/a/german-neo-nazi-training-in-russia/30655860.html>

**Recommended, not required: Courseworks Files:**

Sergey Horujy (trans. Patrick Lally Michelson), “Slavophiles, Westernizers, and the Birth of Russian Philosophical Humanism,” in *A History of Russian Philosophy 1830–1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defense of Human Dignity*, ed. Gary M. Hamburg and Randall Allen Poole (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 27-50.

Jan. 21: Critiquing a recent attempt at theorizing. **Please note:** it is very important that you read this piece before class; in class today we will spend the entire time critiquing this piece from the standpoint of the theories we have discussed. This should be good practice for writing your essay due on Sunday.

**CLIO:**

Michael McFaul, “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy,” *International Security* 45, no. 2 (Fall 2020): 95-139.

**Sunday, Jan. 24, 5pm: First essay due (defense of chosen theoretical perspective)**

**Part II: Russian Military Interventions since 2014**

Jan. 25: Background: The Russian Reaction to NATO Enlargement

**Courseworks Files:**

Rajan Menon and William Ruger, NATO Enlargement and US Grand Strategy: A Net

Assessment,” *International Politics* 57, no. 3 (June 2020): 371-400.

Kimberly Marten, “NATO Enlargement: Evaluating Its Consequences in Russia,” *International Politics* 57, no. 3 (June 2020): 401-426.

Recommended, not required: for a fun 5-minute video on the history and geography of Kaliningrad, see “Mad Maps, Part 4: Kaliningrad: The Tiny Russian 'Ham' Inside An EU 'Sandwich',” RFE/RL, Dec. 30, 2020, <https://www.rferl.org/a/kaliningrad-russia-crazy-borders-mad-maps/31027202.html>

Jan. 26: The 2014 Russian Seizure of Crimea

**Note:** please remember to relook at Forsberg and Pursiainen, “The Psychological Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy: Putin and the Annexation of Crimea,” from Jan. 13.

**CLIO:**

John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin,” *Foreign Affairs*, Sept./Oct. 2014; and the response, Michael McFaul; Stephen Sestanovich; John J. Mearsheimer, “Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?” *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec. 2014.

Jan. 27: The Russian move into Eastern Ukraine

**Open web:**

International Crisis Group, “Rebels without a Cause: Russia’s Proxies in Eastern Ukraine,” Europe Report 254, July 16, 2019, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/254-rebels-without-a-cause%20(1).pdf>

“British Investigators: More Evidence Found Of Russian Role In Donbas,” RFE/RL Ukrainian Service, Aug. 19, 2019, <https://www.rferl.org/a/british-online-research-group-says-more-evidence-found-of-russian-role-in-donbas-conflict/30116665.html>. The original data is found here: “The Battle of Ilovaisk: Mapping Russian Military Presence in Eastern Ukraine

August–September 2014,” <https://ilovaisk.forensic-architecture.org/>

Jan. 28: Russian Intervention in Syria

**Note:** please remember to relook at Marten, “Putin as Patron in Syria,” from Jan. 14.

**Open web:**

Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?” *Military Review*, Mar.-Apr. 2018, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Rojansky-Victory-for-Russia-1.pdf>

Dmitry Adamsky, “The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow’s Syrian Campaign,” PONARS Policy Memo 635, Feb. 2020, <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm635_Adamsky_Feb2020.pdf>

**CLIO:**

Laila Bassam and Tom Perry, “How Iranian General Plotted out Syrian Assault in Moscow,” Reuters, Oct. 6, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-soleimani-insigh/how-iranian-general-plotted-out-syrian-assault-in-moscow-idUSKCN0S02BV20151006>

**Sunday, Jan. 31, 5pm: Second essay due (Russian intervention motives)**

**Part III: Other tools of Russian influence.**

Feb. 1: Russia’s intelligence agencies.

**CLIO:**

Kimberly Marten, “The Intelligence Agencies and Putin: Undermining Russia’s Security?” in Roger Kanet, ed., *Routledge Handbook of Russian Security* (London: Routledge, 2019): 192-202.

**Open web:**

Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services,” European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, May 2016, <http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_169_-_PUTINS_HYDRA_INSIDE_THE_RUSSIAN_INTELLIGENCE_SERVICES_1513.pdf>

Andrei Soldatov (interview), “F.S.B.: Andrei Soldatov Answers the Questions about Russia’s Top Intelligence Agency that You’re Too Afraid to Ask,” Meduza, Dec. 22, 2020, <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/12/22/f-s-b>

**CLIO:**

Rebecca R. Ruiz and Michael Schwirtz, “Russian Insider Says State-Run Doping Fueled Olympic Gold,” *New York Times*, May 12, 2016. (Note: this story is explored in more depth in the highly recommended documentary movie “Icarus,” available on Netflix.)

Feb. 2: Russia’s Use of the Wagner Group

**CLIO:**

Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 35, no. 3 (2019): 181-204.

**Open web:**

Kimberly Marten, “Into Africa: Prigozhin, Wagner, and the Russian Military,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 561 (Jan. 2019), <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm561_Marten_Jan2019_0.pdf>

Kimberly Marten, “Russ-Afrique? Russia, France, and the Central African Republic,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 608 (Aug. 2019), <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm608_Marten_Aug2019..pdf>

Kimberly Marten, “Where’s Wagner? The All-New Exploits of Russia’s “Private” Military Company,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 670 (Sept. 2020), <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/where-wagner-all-new-exploits-russia-private-military-company>

Feb. 3: Russia and cyber conflict

**Open web:**

Bilyana Lilly and Joe Cheravitch, “The Past, Present, and Future of Russia’s Cyber

Strategy and Forces,” Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, May 2020, <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/05/CyCon_2020_8_Lilly_Cheravitch.pdf>

Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” *Wired*, March 3, 2016, <https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/>

Erica Borghard and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Russia's Hack Wasn't Cyberwar. That Complicates US Strategy,” *Wired*, Dec. 17, 2020, <https://www.wired.com/story/russia-solarwinds-hack-wasnt-cyberwar-us-strategy/>

Feb. 4: Election meddling.

**Open web:**

Timothy Frye, “Inside Job: The Challenge of Foreign Online Influence in U.S. Elections,” War on the Rocks, Oct. 6, 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/inside-job-the-challenge-of-foreign-online-influence-in-u-s-elections/>

Kimberly Marten essay (#3), in “Policy Roundtable 1-7: Russia and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election,” H-Diplo International Security Studies Forum, Mar. 26, 2017, <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-7-russia#Essay_by_Kimberly_Marten_Barnard_College_Columbia_University>

**CLIO:**

David Shimer, “Election Meddling in Russia: When Boris Yeltsin asked Bill Clinton for Help,” *Washington Post*, June 26, 2020.

**Sunday, Feb. 7, 5pm: Third essay due (Putin and Russia’s intelligence agencies)**

Feb. 8: Organized crime and the Russian state.

**Open web:**

Mark Galeotti, “Gangster Geopolitics: The Kremlin’s Use of Criminals as Assets Abroad,” Russia Matters Blog, Jan. 17, 2019, <https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/gangster-geopolitics-kremlins-use-criminals-assets-abroad>

Mark Galeotti, “Crimintern: How the Kremlin Uses Russia’s Criminal Networks in Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, April 2017, <https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/ECFR208_-_CRIMINTERM_-_HOW_RUSSIAN_ORGANISED_CRIME_OPERATES_IN_EUROPE02.pdf>

Sebastian Rotella, “A Gangster Place in the Sun: How Spain’s Fight Against the Mob Revealed Russian Power Networks,” ProPublica, Nov. 10, 2017, <https://www.propublica.org/article/fighting-russian-mafia-networks-in-spain>

Feb. 9: Assassination and chemical weapons.

**Open web:**

Bellingcat, “Russia’s Clandestine Chemical Weapons Programme and the GRU’s Unit 29155,” Oct. 23, 2020, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2020/10/23/russias-clandestine-chemical-weapons-programme-and-the-grus-unit-21955/>

Tim Lister, Clarissa Ward and Sebastian Shukla, “Russian Opposition Leader Alexey Navalny Dupes Spy into Revealing How He Was Poisoned,” CNN, Dec. 21, 2020, <https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/21/europe/russia-navalny-poisoning-underpants-ward/index.html>

Wojciech Lorenz, “Russia’s Use of Chemical Weapons: Consequences for NATO,” PISM (Polish Institute for International Affairs) Bulletin 252, Dec. 7, 2020, <https://www.pism.pl/file/12bc5013-6f4f-4216-adb6-02cfbebd3508>

Heidi Blake, et al., “From Russia with Blood,” June 15, 2017, <https://www.buzzfeed.com/heidiblake/from-russia-with-blood-14-suspected-hits-on-british-soil>

Feb. 10: Is energy a weapon? The example of Nord Stream II.

**Open web:**

Paul Belkin, Michael Ratner, and Cory Welt, “Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Running in Place,” Congressional Research Service, Sept. 28, 2020, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11138>

**CLIO:**

Pierre Noël, “Nord Stream II and Europe’s Strategic Autonomy,” *Survival* 61, no. 6 (2019): 89-95.

**Recommended, not required:** Andrew Kramer, “Russia Rising as Global Helium Seller,” *New York Times*, Dec. 24, 2020.

Feb. 11: The West fights back: sanctions on Russia

**Open web:**

Edward Fishman, “Make Russia Sanctions Effective Again,” War on the Rocks, Oct. 23, 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/make-russia-sanctions-effective-again/>

Tatiana Mitrova, “Western Sanctions on Russia’s Oil and Gas Sector: a Damage Assessment,” Carnegie Moscow Center blog, July 25, 2018, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/76909>

**CLIO:**

Steven Lee Myers, Jo Becker and Jim Yardley, “It Pays to Be Putin’s Friend,” *New York Times*, Sept. 27, 2014.

Andrew Higgins and Kenneth P. Vogel, “Two Capitals, One Russian Oligarch: How Oleg Deripaska Is Trying to Escape U.S. Sanctions,” *New York Times*, Nov. 4, 2018.

**Recommended, not required:** For a constantly updated list of global sanctions on Russia, see: <https://sanctionsexplorer.org/analytics> and click on Russia on the map.CSIS Russian Sanctions Tracker, <https://russiasanctionstracker.csis.org/>, has a more detailed list of all US sanctions against Russia through 2018 (but hasn’t been updated since then).

Sunday, Feb. 14, 5pm: Fourth essay due (Russia as a rogue state)

**Part IV: Other current events (note: this part of the course is subject to change, based on the news)**

Feb. 15: The collapse of arms control?

**Courseworks files:**

“The Prospects for Russia–US Arms Control ahead of New START’s Expiry,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Strategic Comment, Oct. 2020.

**Open web:**

Pranay Vaddi, “Bringing Russia’s New Nuclear Weapons into New START,” Lawfare blog, Aug. 13, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/08/13/bringing-russia-s-new-nuclear-weapons-into-new-start-pub-79672>

**CLIO:**

Olga Oliker, “Moscow’s Nuclear Enigma: What Is Russia’s Arsenal Really For?” *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2018): 52-57.

**Recommended, not required:** Amy F. Woolf, *Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service Report R43832, updated Oct. 29, 2018, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf>

Feb. 16: The “near abroad,” “frozen conflicts,” and Nagorno-Karabakh.

**Courseworks Files:**

Andrei A. Kazantsev, Peter Rutland, Svetlana M. Medvedeva & Ivan A.

Safranchuk, “Russia’s Policy in the “Frozen Conflicts” of the Post-Soviet

Space: From Ethno-politics to Geopolitics,” *Caucasus Survey* 8, no. 2 (April 2020): 142-62.

**CLIO:**

Robert Orttung and Christopher Walker, “Putin’s Frozen Conflicts,” ForeignPolicy.com, Feb. 13, 2015.

**Open web:**

Alexander Gabuev, “Viewpoint: Russia and Turkey: Unlikely Victors of Karabakh Conflict,” BBC, Nov. 12, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54903869>

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Feb. 17: Russia and the Arctic.

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Mathieu Boulègue, *Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in*

*a ‘Low Tension’ Environment,* Chatham House Research Paper, June 2019, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-28-Russia-Military-Arctic_0.pdf>

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Jake Cordell, “Arctic Oil Spill: Nornickel Failures, Tank Flaws Caused Catastrophe – Report,” The Moscow Times, Nov. 26, 2020, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/11/26/arctic-oil-spill-nornickel-failures-tank-flaws-caused-catastrophe-report-a72156>

Feb. 18: China (and the acronym organizations)

**CLIO:**

Alexander Lukin, “A Russian Perspective on the Sino-Russian Rapprochement,” *Asia Policy* 13, no. 1 (Jan. 2018): 19-25

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Alexander Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations

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Alexander Gabuev, “China’s Pivot to Putin’s Friends,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 25, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/25/chinas-pivot-to-putin-friends-xi-russia-gazprom-timchenko-sinopec/>

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Saori N. Katada, Cynthia Roberts, and Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The Varieties of Collective Financial Statecraft: The BRICS and China,” *Political Science Quarterly* 132, no. 3 (Fall 2017): 403-433.

Sunday, Feb. 21, 5pm: Fifth essay due (current trendlines)

Feb. 22: There is nothing so difficult to predict as the future.

**Open web:**

Kadri Liik, *The Last of the Offended: Russia’s First Post-Putin Diplomats*, Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Affairs, Nov. 2019, <https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Kadri_Liik_russias_first_post_putin_diplomats.pdf>

Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov, “Putin, Unlimited? Challenges to Russia’s Regime After the Reset of Presidential Terms,” Carnegie Moscow Center, Dec. 9, 2020, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/83413>